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Abstract. We present both a game theoretic and a distributed algorith-
mic approach for the transit price negotiation problem in the interdomain
routing framework. The analysis of the centralized transit price negoti-
ation problem shows that the only one non cooperative equilibrium is
when the lowest cost provider takes all the market. The perspective of
the game being repeated makes cooperation possible while maintaining
higher prices. We consider then the system under a realistic distributed
framework and simulate its behaviour under a simple price adjustment
strategy and analyse whether it matches the theoretical results.
Keywords: interdomain routing, repeated games, distributed algorith-
mic.
1 Introduction
Today inter-domain market plays on two different time scales: A long term time
scale (months or even years) where economic contracts are negotiated and a
short term (seconds) where routing decisions are made based on the concluded
business relationships. Some recent works [1, 4, 5] propose to couple those two
processes more tightly by enabling a more dynamic interaction between transit
price propositions and routing decisions. In order to capture the dynamic aspect
of such interaction, authors of these papers propose to employ a repeated game
approach. The repeated game framework enables to capture how the threat of a
future behaviour can impact the current actions of players.
In [1], the repeated routing game is introduced and a price matching strategy
is proposed and analysed. The difference between the analysis in this work and
our proposal is that we consider that the traffic dedicated to a given destination
can be routed only through a single provider. This assumption is made in order
to maintain a coherence with the Border Gateway Protocol where only one path
is chosen to each destination. In our proposal, we still consider an interaction
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between transit price negotiation and routing decision process. The bilateral eco-
nomic nature of the Internet is still maintained by a cascade like pricing where
each agent negotiates low prices only with his immediate neighbours. This is
different from the source based pricing approach taken in [1]. We propose an ad-
equate model to capture the different dimensions of the problem then we focus
on the analysis of the related game on some specific scenario mainly by consid-
ering the simple but not simplistic case of one source and one destination. In
the game analysis, we assume a full knowledge of the different parameters of
the problem, which is not very realistic but gives an idea about the nature of
the game. Further, we will analyse the problem from a distributed point of view
taking into account realistic considerations.
2 The transit price negotiation model
The network is given by a graph G(N, E, cost) where N represents the ASs, cost
is the unitary cost related to managing the transit over the AS intra-network
and E are the physical inter-domain links. We will focus on an only one traffic
flow between a node S which is the source of the traffic, it can be an access
network and the node Dest its destination. The rest of the nodes are providers.
A random variable P represents the period on which inputs (graph, traffic Ma-
trix) are stable. We assume that P follows an exponential law with mean D,
that can be obtained by some statistical knowledge or stochastic analysis. We
consider that the source has an upper bound on price under which she accepts to
send the traffic. Otherwise, she does not send the traffic. We will denote it pmax.
We consider discrete transit prices. Price discretisation depends on the encoding
format in control packets, for instance here we take a unit discretization. That
is provider transit price can take values as 1, 2, 3, . . ..
During the period P , the inputs of the problem are stable and a stationary en-
vironment game can model interactions between ASs during the transit price
negotiation. Each AS announces its transit price to his neighbours with the cor-
responding route into the destination. When an AS decides to buy a route from
its neighbour, he can itself announce this route to his own neighbours while
proposing an adequate transit price. Thus, the negotiation follows a cascade like
model from the destination backward to the source, where each AS in the path
plays both the customer and the provider role. The objective of each provider
is clearly to maximize its own benefit by proposing attractive transit prices but
also by choosing itself the lowest providers. In case of identical announces, an
AS can choose a provider following a pre-order on his providers. Our goal is to
analyse equilibrium situations where ASs do not have the incentive to deviate
from their proposed prices and to check whether such situations are beneficial
to the sender (the source).
The game proceeds in series of stages of identical duration d a constant of com-
mon knowledge. Then d/D models the probability of the game coming to an
end. We consider δ such that d/D = 1− δ the probability that the game is still
taking place. Hence, the game arrives to stage k with probability δk. At the start
of each stage : Each player advertises its per packet price . We suppose that each
AS is aware of the history of the game; that is after each stage all ASs are aware
of proposed prices and consequent outcomes on the previous stages.
A powerful notion while analysing a repeated game is the subgame perfect equi-
librium[6], where the played strategies represent a Nash equilibrium in each
subgame. That is given any history of the game given by past plays, the adopted
strategies still represent a Nash equilibrium trough the rest of the game. A set of
strategies can be proved to induce a subgame perfect equilibrium if they satisfy
the one deviation principle. This principle ensures that no player can increase
its utility by deviating from its original strategy at a single stage. The intuition
behind this principle is that improving the utility of a player supposes that at
least at one stage the pay-off obtained by deviating is greater than the one in
the original strategy. Thus, in order to prove that the set of strategies form a
subgame perfect equilibrium, it is sufficient to prove that they satisfy the one
deviation principle.
Now, let us analyse our game under these considerations on a simple scenario.
First, we consider the simple case where there is a single communication in
a network of 4 vertices, one source and one destination and two intermediate
providers. We consider that providers have identical costs. There exists an anal-
ogy with the Bertrand game [3]. Bertrand game models interactions between
duopoly firms that propose homogeneous products and compete only on price.
The consumers buy all products from the cheaper firm or half at each when
the price is equal. In the Bertrand game, firms are supposed to have the same
marginal cost, when the customer demand is supposed to be linear in the price.
A monopoly price p is given and represents the price that the firm will charge
if she had the monopole on the market. In our simple scenario providers have
identical costs when demand is constant. The monopole price is given by pmax
since it is the maximum price that can be charged.
There are two possible outcomes in Bertrand competition : Both firms decide to
not cooperate and price the only non-cooperative Nash equilibrium which is to
charge the marginal cost c. Indeed for each price p1 proposed by firm1, the best
response of firm2 consists for every p1 > c in lowering slightly the price to win
the market. The only one equilibrium is (c,c). Note that when marginal costs are
different, the firm with lower marginal cost can win all the market. Otherwise,
both firms can cooperate and charge the monopoly price p and thus share the
market. Since BGP requires a single routing, splitting the traffic can be done on
time by alternating (pmax, pmax+1) announces. Hence, for instance player 1 wins
over even stages and player 2 over odd ones. In order to make this threat credible
a punishment should be added to avoid deviations. Thus, a possible strategy can
be to alternate (pmax, pmax + 1) announces and if player 1 for instance deviates
by playing p′ = pmax− 1
1 in stage 2k then player 2 plays p′− 1 in stage 2k +1.
This strategy satisfies the one stage deviation principle for sufficiently patient
1
p
′ should be lower than pmax in order to win the game but the higher possible to
make the maximum benefit. Given the unit discretisation, that price is pmax − 1
players. Indeed, suppose without loss of generality that player 1 decides to de-
viate by playing pmax− 1 in an odd stage 2k then player 2 will play pmax− 1 in
the stage 2k+1. Considering an only one stage deviation, the game will continue
with the original strategy. Then pay offs will differ only in stage 2k and 2k + 1.
In stage 2k player 1 wins with price p−1 and in stage 2k +1 he will loose which
give him a total benefit of pmax−1
2. When in the original strategy he would get
a total pay-off of pmax. The expected improvement is given by discounting the
pay off by the probability of the game taking place at the corresponding stage.
Hence the deviation is profitable iff: (pmax−1)∗δ
2k > pmax ∗δ
2k+1 that is when
δ ≥ pmax−1pmax the one deviation principle is satisfied for sufficiently patient players
and the proposed strategy is then a subgame perfect equilibrium. Note, that this
strategy is profitable to both providers but is not profitable to the source since
it induces a flip-flop like routing. This behaviour can easily be generalized to the
case of n providers with identical costs.
Let us consider now the case of one source and one destination with n pos-
sible intermediate providers having different costs. For the purpose of simplicity,
let us assume that cost1 < cost2 < . . . < costn where costi is the cost of provider
i 3. The utility of the provider is the difference between its price and its cost if
he wins and 0 otherwise. Again, similarly with the Bertrand game the only one
non cooperative equilibrium is when the lowest cost provider (here provider 1)
takes all the market by proposing cost2 − 1. Again the perspective of the game
being repeated makes cooperation possible in order to maintain higher prices
and strategies can be constructed with the same intuition to prevent deviations.
However, given that costs are different, many cooperations are possible. For ex-
ample, provider 1 can announce a price in [cost2..cost3 − 1]
4 in order to invite
provider 2 to join him and share the market. Actually, they can cooperate by
both setting the price at cost3− 1 the maximum price such that they can get all
the market. In such a situation, we will talk about coalition and denote the set
of providers joining it coalition2 = {1, 2}. And so on, provider 1 can set a price
in [costi−1..costi − 1] in order to invite provider i− 1 to join him and share the
market then forming coalitioni = {1..i}.
Obviously coalitioni ⊂ coalitionj iff i < j that is if a provider j can join a
given coalition then every provider i < j can do. Also, each provider i can only
join a coalitionj where j >= i. Note that if providers i = 1, . . . , j decide to
cooperate thus forming coalitionj and given that they are all utility maximisers
they should announce costj+1 − 1. Hence, we will talk about strategy of joining
coalition j when the strategy consists on setting price equal to costj+1 − 1.
Now, the question that arises is which coalition will be chosen and would all
providers necessary to form it have actually incentive to join it. Let denote sji
2 of course multiplied by the amount of traffic, but here we consider without loss of
generality a unit of traffic
3 When cost1 ≤ cost2 ≤ . . . ≤ costn, we obtain the same results, we need just to
consider class of providers having the same cost.
4 integer values in the corresponding interval
the strategy of player i that consists in choosing to join coalitionj where j ≥ i.
This can be done by provider i setting a price pji = costj+1 − 1.
The utility of a player i when choosing coalitionj is given by:
ui(s
j
i , s−i) =



0 if ∃i′, j′ < j s.t si′ = s
j′
i′
pj
i
−costi
|{i′/si′=s
j
i′
}|
otherwise
That is, the utility of provider i is 0 if another provider proposes a lower price,
otherwise he shares the market with the other providers that have proposed the
same price as him. Hence the utility of player i choosing a coalitionj given that
all other providers i′ ≤ j have also join that coalition is (pji − costi)/j. Each
player is expected to choose the coalition that maximizes such utility. We will
denote the corresponding strategy ( price announced ) s∗i .
For instance for provider 1 s∗1 = max{cost2−cost1−1, . . . ,
costn−cost1−1
n−1 ,
pmax−cost1
n }
and we denote coalitionj∗ the corresponding coalition. Now, the question is
whether providers {2, . . . , j∗} will choose to join the same coalition. That is
coalitionj∗ is the coalition that maximizes their utility too. The answer is given
by the following theorem:
Theorem 1. If coalitionj∗ is the coalition that maximizes the first provider
utility then it maximizes providers 2, . . . , j∗ utilities:
∀i′ ∈ {2, . . . , j∗} s∗i′ = s
j∗
i′
The proof skipped due to space limit can be found in the research report [2].
That is the lowest cost provider chooses his preferred coalition and the in-
volved providers follow him. When different best coalitions are possible (with the
same utility) a problem of coordination can arise. A dominant strategy for the
lowest cost provider is to choose the lowest coalition and for the other members
to follow him. When a player k deviates players 1, .., k−1 punish him by playing
according to coalitionk−1. For sufficiently patient players, this is a subgame per-
fect equilibrium. The intuition, is that the punishment will exclude the deviator
from the coalition for the rest of the game.
Let us consider now the case where instead of direct connection, providers are
connected via disjoint routes to the source. Let us denote i the direct provider
connected to the destination, i′ the corresponding provider connected to the
source and li the length of the route between i and i
′. Without loss of gener-
ality we consider l1 < l2 < . . . < ln. The benefit of a provider is the difference
between the price at which he has bought the route (the price of his provider)
and the price at which he proposes the route to his customer. The net benefit is
obtained by subtracting the transit cost. For simplicity assume first that there
are no transit costs. That is a customer is interested to buy a route if at least
he can make a benefit of 1.
The game can be separated into two different games: the sequential game that
each provider i plays with his predecessors on the route to s and the simulta-
neous game that players i = 1 . . . n are playing in order to fix their price. This
separation is possible and relevant only because paths are disjoint. Indeed on
each route, players between i and i′ including i′ are completely dependent on
i the owner of the route toward the destination. This game is known as the
ultimatum game [6] where some value is to be divided between some players.
A given player (called the first mover) proposes a division of the value and the
others can only accept the division or refuse it inducing utility of 0 to everyone.
The optimal strategy for the player proposing the division is to take the max-
imum portion and let to the others the minimum such they are still interested
( in a continuous setting ε and in a discrete frame setting 1) which is an Nash
equilibrium. The player who is proposing the division has an advantage because
he is the first mover in the sequential game. In our case, if there is for example
only one route, the provider 1 is the first mover because he announces a route to
the destination first and he should propose the route at pmax− l1 letting each of
the other intermediate providers get a benefit of 1 (the route is proposed then to
the source at pmax). The following providers will then accept since they prefer
to get a benefit of 1 rather than to lose the market.
When there are several routes the provider i has to fix his price depending on
the simultaneous game he is playing with the other direct providers. Providers
directly connected to the destination ({1, . . . , n}) have to take into account that
each provider on the correspondent path should at least make a benefit of 1.
Hence each of the n possible routes can be proposed to the source at least at
li + 1 by each corresponding i
′. The problem can be viewed then as n providers
proposing to connect directly the source and the destination as in the former
case with each provider i having a cost li + 1. The lowest cost provider who has
the market power is the one on the shortest path. As we have argued above,
he chooses his optimal coalition and the other involved providers follow him.
Intermediate providers have to propose the price at which they have bought
the route +1, otherwise their route will not be chosen by the source. Note that
when internal transit costs are not null then we can obtain the same results by
considering as metric the sum of transit costs. We give an example that help
to understand how the situation can be different in the general case from the
special cases.
Example 1. Let us consider the network given in Fig. 1. Suppose that the source
has a pmax = 8. Provider 1 prefers to join coalition2 since (6/2 > 8/3) and
provider 2 follows him. They will then propose p1 = 6 and p2 = 5. Provider 4
should announce 1 to insure that the second route will be chosen. His advantage
is that he blocks the third route. he can propose a coalition to provider 1 where
they can improve their benefit. The first and the second route still shares the
market but at a higher price (pmax) as depicted in Fig 1. Provider 2 conserves
his benefit and have non incentive to punish provider 1 or 4. Provider 4 acts as a
stopper of the third route and thus can propose a second coalition that improve
his benefit without decreasing benefit of provider 2.
Fig. 1. Cases of non disjoint routes between the source and the destination
This is the intuition we have used to propose an algorithm that computes prices
in the general case [2]. It consists in computing successive coalitions to improve
intermediary providers benefit while respecting precedent coalitions.
3 The dynamic distributed game
In this section we try to analyse how the system behaves in a distributed frame-
work. Indeed, in reality nodes have only a local view of the game including the
topology and thus the nature and the length of the possible routes. We simulate
the distributed game and investigate if some specific local strategies can lead to
a similar results than the one expected by the theoretical analysis. For this pur-
pose, we need to introduce first the distributed algorithmic model. The system
is still modeled by a graph linking the source S and the destination Dest with m
nodes labeled i ∈ {1 . . . n . . . m} where the direct nodes are {1 . . . n}. We denote
Successor(i) the set of possible providers of node i and Predecessor(i) the set
of possible customers of the node i. A Node i is characterized by the following
variables: Current price per unit of traffic denoted pi which is announced by
the node i to his neighbours in Predecessor(i), Current Provider denoted
provider(i) which is one of node’s neighbours that can reach the destination.
It is the one who proposes the best price to i. For j = provider(i) we have
pj ≤ pk ∀k ∈ Successor(i) , State denoted state(i) that indicates whether the
node is crossed by the transit traffic (O) or not (N). That means that the node
belongs to the chosen route. For the special case of the source the state indicates
whether the source has received at least an acceptable route (its price is lower
than pmax ) or not. We define the set Customer(j) = {k/provider(k) = j}. We
have pi > pprovider(i) ∀i that is a node proposes a route at a price higher than the
price at which he has bought it. Every node chooses the provider that proposes
the lowest route price. If a node chooses a provider j and thereafter it receives
from a provider k a proposal of a route with lower price it switches toward k.
In a distributed setting, each node is informed of all the variables of its neigh-
bours using traffic control. However all routes may not be visible at every node:
the set of routes learned at one node depends on route selection at its provider.
Node’s state depends on the route chosen by the source. At the beginning each
node’s state is equal to N because routes are not established yet. Node’s state
is updated when he receives a state update message from its neighbours as fol-
lowing: state(i)= O if ∃j ∈ Customer(i) such that state(j) = O or if i = S
and pprovider(S) ≤ pmax. and N otherwise. Hence when the source chooses an
acceptable route, its state changes to O and then it sends an update message
to its provider who in turns changes his state and so on until the destination.
When the source switches on a new received route with a better price, the state
of nodes on the new route is updated iteratively into O when the state of the
nodes on the old route is updated iteratively into N .
We propose to test a simple strategy that all the nodes can use to update their
price depending on their state: if state(i) = O then pi ←− pi + 1 otherwise
state(i) = N and then if (pi − pprovider(i)) > 1 then pi ←− pi − 1.
The intuition behind this strategy is that providers with no transit traffic de-
crease their prices in order to attract the traffic. Each provider accepts to transit
the traffic if he has at least a benefit of 1 and does not decrease its price under
this limit. When a provider gets the transit traffic, he tries to increase his price
in order to reach the maximum possible benefit.
4 Simulation analysis
Our objective here is to study the stabilizing behaviour of the distributed system
under the above price adjustment strategy and whether it matches the theoreti-
cal results. Simulation is done using OMNET [7] simulator. We consider different
topologies (Fig. 2). Links have the same propagation delay equal to 0.31 ms. Nei-
ther queuing nor scheduling delays are considered in the simulation. Node state
messages are generated automatically when the node state is updated and are
sent as traffic control messages. In our simulation, the stage game duration is
d = 50ms. We implement the simple price adjustment strategy explained above
and consider different scenarios:
Scenario 1: We consider topology 2 and simulate the price adjustment strategy
when transit prices starts from a high price (chosen > pmax = 20 as depicted in
Fig. 3 at the left side. Then prices are adjusted until t= 150 ms (stage 4) where
routes proposed to the source become acceptable. Both routes share the market
but at a higher price. Direct providers have an advantage over intermediate ones,
the first one taking the maximum benefit.
When a direct provider chooses to start at a price lower than pmax as in the
scenario depicted in Fig. 3 at the right side then his route is selected during
few steps. Prices are then adjusted until a situation where both routes share the
Fig. 2. The different simulated topologies
Fig. 3. Providers benefit in scenario 1
market. Note that provider 41 and 44 would have better benefit with the prece-
dent scenario where they started both at pmax. In summary, this simple strategy
gives similar results to those expected by the theoretical analysis using only local
information. Indeed, when providers start from high prices they can share the
market while maintaining higher prices than when they do not cooperate.
Scenario 2: We consider now topology 3, where three different direct providers
compete for the market. We simulate the price adjustment strategy where all
transit prices starting from pmax = 20. Direct providers benefits and interme-
diate providers benefits are depicted in Fig 4. As with topology 1, prices are
adjusted until step = 150 ms (stage 4) where routes proposed to the source be-
come acceptable. However, direct providers do not succeed in maintaining high
prices. This can be explained by the way prices are updated. Indeed, the three
routes share the market but each provider lowers it price at least two times (when
the other routes are chosen) but increases only one time its price. This leads the
prices to decrease drastically. We need a more elaborated strategy in order to
obtain a behaviour which is similar to the theoretical expected behaviour.
Fig. 4. Direct providers and intermediary providers benefits in scenario 2
5 Conclusion
We present a combined game theoretic and distributed algorithmic approach to
the transit price negotiation problem. We highlight situations where cooperation
is possible in order to maintain higher prices. However such situations lead to a
flip flop routing. An interesting issue is to investigate how the source can avoid
such behaviour for example by adding some penalties when its provider changes
its price. A more elaborated local strategies are currently tested mainly based
on stochastic learning of optimal strategies. Finally we are investigating how to
generalize the proposed approach to a network where there are different sources
and destinations for the traffic while considering coherent routing.
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